Introduction
Verbs of creation denote the coming into being of the referent of their direct internal argument as a result of the event named by them. Such verbs are therefore often said to take 'effected objects'.
Examples in which the entity created is a physical object:
(1) (a) Rebecca built a Victorian style house. The characterization is intended to cover so-called performance verbs as well, though in this case the entities created are events (namely, performances) and not physical objects:
(2) (a) Rebecca said a prayer for dinner.
(b) Sarah sang a sad song. (c) Daniel recited a poem by E. E. Cummings.
In (2), the events described by the verbs are themselves the performances created, but the performances count as instances of the entities named by the object noun phrases.
The characterization accommodates also verbs whose internal argument denotes an abstract entity that intuitively comes into being as a result of the event in question: Such entities are minimally physically represented in the brains of their respective creators immediately following the corresponding creation events.
The main condition for abstract entities which are created is that they be represented in some physical medium, for otherwise it would be unclear what their 'coming into being' amounts to.
2 Verbs of creation fall into three subclasses, depending on the semantic character of their direct internal argument:
-verbs denoting the creation of a physical object, -verbs denoting the creation of an event (henceforth, 'performance verbs of creation'), and -verbs denoting the creation of an abstract entity.
Since physical objects and events are both concrete entities, the first two subclasses form a natural subclass against the subclass of verbs denoting the creation of an abstract entity.
A verb can belong to more than one subclass.
Verbs like build and make can have a reading on which their internal argument refers to an abstract entity: Such verbs are ambiguous with respect to the character of their internal argument (physical object vs. abstract entity); the two meanings in question are intimately related, and any analysis should make this explicit, especially because on both readings a physical object is created.
Performance verbs of creation may take an abstract entity as their internal argument (cf. also 2c):
(6) (a) Rebecca said a prayer for dinner that Sarah wrote.
(b) Sarah wrote a prayer for dinner. Rebecca said it.
(7) (a) Daniel played a piece for the piano that Rebecca composed. (b) Rebecca composed a piece for the piano. Daniel played it.
A reasonable conjecture: If a performance verb of creation heads a clause that is aspectually an accomplishment (which is the intended reading of the sentences in (2) and (6)- (7)), then its internal argument denotes an abstract entity.
Creating physical objects

The model structure
The semantic analysis in section 2.2 will be formulated with the help of a standard higher order extensional type theoretical language Lc with lambda abstraction, identity, and the iota operator.
A model for Lc is a pair M = 〈S, I〉, where S is a model structure and I is an interpretation function.
S is a tuple
where D, O, E, and T are nonempty sets of individuals, <, ≺ , trace, and exist are distinguished relations on one or more of these sets, and d0 is a special nil individual in D.
The sets O, E, and T are pairwise disjoint and each forms a subset of D. O is a set of physical objects, E is a set of events, and T is a set of times. There are sorted variables for the elements of each of these three domains: The relation < on D×D is a mereological relation of proper part (a < b 'a is a proper part of b').
It is a strict partial order (i.e., irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive), and the following notions are based on it and identity (in (9c), P is a one-place predicate with an extension in D):
(a is a sum of P)
The overlap relation ('Überlappen') in (9b) allows the following principle for proper part to be stated more compactly:
(one proper part implies another)
This axiom excludes the possibility that an individual has a single proper part.
The sum relation in (9c) is demonstrably functional with respect to its individual argument:
This fact allows us to introduce iota terms for sums in case they exist:
A special case of sum is when two individuals are summed:
(the sum of a and b) 4 The final mereological principle guarantees the existence of sums whenever the extension of P is nonempty:
This axiom has the consequence that D also includes 'mixed' individuals such as sums of physical objects and events and sums of events and times.
Letting [X]σ  designate the closure ('Abschluss') of X under the sum operation, for a given set X, we now postulate that the closure of the union of O, E, T, and {d0} under the sum operation is a subset of D: 
The following principle states that temporal precedence (s ≺ s' ) is incompatible with overlap:
(temporal precedence excludes overlap)
In contrast to O and E, T has a linear structure, which means that any two times either stand in the precedence relation or overlap:
Instants are times without proper parts:
The relation trace on T × [E ∪ T]σ  is postulated to be functional with respect to its time argument, as stated in (20a), and supplies the time (or temporal trace) of a temporal individual (trace(t, s) 't is the temporal trace of s').
The time of a time is simply that time, as postulated in (20b).
(the temporal trace of a time is that time)
Given the functionality of trace with respect to its time argument, we may speak of the temporal trace of a temporal individual:
(the time of an event or a time)
Axioms for τ:
(the time of a sum of temporal individuals is the sum of their times)
(precedence of temporal individuals implies precedence of their times)
Temporal individuals that do not stretch infinitely into the future have an end.
End of a temporal individual 't is an end of s':
If a temporal individual has an end, then it demonstrably has a unique end, but since there may be temporal individuals that stretch infinitely into the future, end is not a total function:
(uniqueness of ends of temporal individuals)
This fact allows us to speak of the end of a temporal individual, provided that it has an end:
The iota operator plays a role in definitions of sum (σ; (12)), temporal trace (τ ; (21)), and end (ε ; (25)) above, and the question arises about what happens when descriptions formed with the help of the iota operator fail to be defined.
A Fregean strategy: Postulate a nil individual d0 as the denotation of such undefined descriptions (= a technical convenience that enables Lc to remain bivalent).
The semantics for the iota operator:
A temporal individual exists at a time just in case the value of τ applied to it is that time-in this sense, a temporal individual has its time of existence built into it.
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The relation exist on O×T (exist(x, t): 'x exists at t') fulfills the need to talk about physical objects existing at times:
(existence of a physical object at a time implies its existence at all subtimes)
The relation exist is divisive with respect to its physical object argument:
(existence of a physical object at a time implies existence of its parts then)
This axiom asserts that if x exists at t, then every part of x exists at t, which is a way of saying that physical objects lack temporal parts.
A tensed version of < is defined as follows:
is a proper part of y at t)
In contrast to <, <t requires both of the physical objects to exist at t.
Example for illustrating the role of exist a partial model described in (30):
Cf. text, p.8
The semantic analysis, I
With Lc, we can turn to the analysis of verbs denoting the creation of a physical object.
All of these verbs share a thematic relation on E ×O as their common core of meaning. Four properties that a thematic relation may have (cf. Krifka 1989 (cf. Krifka , 1992 :
A thematic relation R satisfies the property uniqueness of physical objects just in case it is functional with respect to its physical object argument:
(R satisfies uniqueness of physical objects)
Thematic uniqueness: the thematic role in question may be assigned to at most one argument.
The relation R satisfies the property uniqueness of events just in case it is functional with respect to its event argument:
R satisfies uniqueness of events)
This in turn encodes a prohibition against iterativity: the physical object may stand in this relation at most once to a event.
The relation R satisfies the property weak mapping to physical objects just in case any subevent of its event argument e is a part of a subevent of e that stands in the relation R to a part of the physical object argument of R:
(R satisfies weak mapping to physical objects)
Notice that this property does not require every subevent of e to be mapped to a part of x, but only that every subevent of e be covered by such a mapping.
The converse of this property is weak mapping to events, which is fulfilled by R only if any part of its physical object argument x is a part of a part of x that stands in the relation R to a subevent of the event argument of R:
(R satisfies weak mapping to events)
As before, this does not require every part of x to be mapped to a part of e, but only that every part of x be included in such a mapping.
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The four properties in (31) and (32) capture a sense in which a physical object may participate incrementally in an event.
Introduction of a particular thematic relation incremental that is postulated to have these properties:
(incremental satisfies the four properties in (31) and (32)) The thematic relation created is a tensed version of incremental that requires the physical object to exist at the end of the event in question and at no time during the event before its end:
created inherits the four thematic properties of incremental:
∧ WMAP-E(created) (created satisfies the four properties in (31) and (32)) The common meaning component of verbs denoting the creation of a physical object is precisely the relation created.
Exemple: Analysis of sentence in (1a) (using Kratzer's 1996 proposal) Schematic syntactic structure indicated in (37a), its corresponding event predicate is shown in (37b), which is the straightforward result of type-driven functional application:
Cf. text, p.11
The event predicate in (37b) is demonstrably quantized (which is characteristic of accomplishments).
Quantized reference for one-place predicates of individuals is defined in (38a), and the corresponding result for the event predicate in (37b) is given in (38b).
(The proof makes use of uniqueness of objects, uniqueness of events, weak mapping to objects, and of course the fact that victorian-style-house is quantized. Compare Krifka 1992, T11, p. 41).
(b) Fact. QUA(λ e[∃y[build(e) ∧created(e,y)∧victorian-style-house(y)] ∧ agent(e, rebecca)]) (the event predicate in (37b) is quantized) 10
Creating events and templates
A treatment of performance verbs of creation and those denoting the creation of an abstract individual.
Extending Lc to L+c
Cf. text, pp.12-13
The relation between the physical house and the abstract house design (i.e. a house template) is one of instantiation, symbolized as : x x ('x instantiates x').
The relation between the architectural house plan and the abstract house design is one of representation, symbolized as ⇒: y ⇒ x ('y represents x').
Both of these relations are irreflexive, asymmetric, and intransitive.
Definition of a notion of derivative instantiation, designated by ', which relates the physical house to the architectural house plan: x ' y ( 'x derivatively instantiates y)'.
Cf. text, p.13
A concrete individual may be (in fact, usually is) more detailed than an abstract individual that it instantiates, provided that its extra detail does not conflict with the information that the abstract individual specifies.
This permits a concrete individual to instantiate many different abstract individuals, where the latter differ from each other according to the information (greater or less detail) that they specify.
In contrast, the relation of representation as construed here is much less liberal and requires a tight fit between the representing individual and the represented individual. A way to capture this is to say that any concrete individual represents at most one abstract individual (see (43)).
Cf. text, p.14 On the present conception, the abstract house design in Figure 2 is an abstract individual and not a (first order) property or a kind. This is a somewhat delicate distinction, because properties and kinds may be treated as individuals, and yet such a possible treatment should not affect the distinction in question.
-
------------
Dölling (2001) analyzes (first order) properties as (first order) individuals, calling them 'kinds'.
He relates ordinary individuals to kinds with the help of a relation INST 'instance of'. For example, he would formalize the statement that x is a house as 'x INST house', which is paraphrasable as 'x is an instance of the kind house'. More generally, his kinds play the same role that (first order) predicates play in L+c (and Lc). However, Dölling's strategy of treating properties as kinds qua individuals is orthogonal to (and hence compatible with) the present point that the abstract house design x is an abstract individual but not a kind qua individual.
In L+c , the formalization of the statement that x is a house (namely, an abstract house design) would be 'HOUSE(x)', where HOUSE is a (first order) predicate of abstract house designs.
Observe that if we adopted Dölling's approach here and treated HOUSE as a kind qua individual, the formalization of the previous statement would be 'x INST HOUSE', which would also bring home the point that x is being treated as a particular individual (albeit abstract) and not as a kind qua individual. Definition of a notion of derivative existence at a time for templates in terms of the existence at a time of physical objects that represent them and of representation (⇒) (as a relation on O×M):
derivatively exists at t)
In Figure 2 , the house design derivatively exists at a time t if the house plan exists at t.
The following principle requires every template to derivatively exist at a time:
∃t[EXIST(m, t)]] (templates derivatively exist at a time)
This axiom requires every template to be existentially anchored to a physical object that represents it.
Note also that a template ceases to exist at a time (in the sense of EXIST) once there is no longer any physical object representing it that exists at that time.
The tight fit between a physical object and a template that it represents is captured by the following principle, which states that the relation of representation ⇒ is functional with respect to its template argument:
uniqueness of templates in representation)
Although every template is represented by a physical object, it need not be instantiated by any individual. The relation of instantiation is a relation on (O∪E ∪T)×M.
If a template is instantiated by a concrete individual, then the concrete individual has to be of the appropriate sort:
(sortal correspondence for the instantiation of templates)
Definition of a relation of derivative instantiation, a relation on (O∪E ∪T)×M (?), in terms of instantiation and representation:
Templates may have subtemplates. (e.g. the house template in Figure 2 has a subtemplate that leaves out the information about the door and the windows.)
Definition of proper subtemplate (<') in terms of representation and proper part:
is a proper subtemplate of m')
Definition of template analogues of the mereological relations in (9), (12), and (13) (where Q is a one-place predicate of templates):
(the sum of m and m')
Existence of sums of templates: (48) Axiom. ∃m[Q(m)] → ∃m[SUM(m, Q)] (existence of sums for templates)
Three mapping principles regulate the relations of instantiation and representation:
(mapping from templates to instantiations)
(mapping from templates to representations)
(mapping from representations to templates)
A model for L+c is a pair M = 〈S, I〉, where S is a model structure and I is an interpretation function.
S is now a tuple
where Om, Em, Tm are nonempty sets of templates for physical objects, templates for events, and templates for times, respectively, such that each is a subset of D, is a relation of instantiation (between concrete individuals and templates), ⇒ is a relation of realization (between physical objects and templates), and the other components of S are as they are in the model structure for Lc.
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The semantic analysis, II
Performance verbs of creation and verbs denoting the creation of abstract individuals take an internal argument designating a template.
Introduction of a thematic relation INCREMENTAL between events and templates that is the analogue of the relation incremental between events and physical objects.
Thematic properties corresponding to those in (31a) and (32a) (where S is a two-place relation between events and templates):
(S satisfies uniqueness of templates)
(S satisfies weak mapping to templates)
(e',m'')]] (S satisfies weak mapping to events)
INCREMENTAL satisfies the three properties in (50):
INCREMENTAL should not have a template analogue of uniqueness of events, because it is possible to create a given template more than once.
Definition of a template variant CREATED of the thematic relation created introduced in (34):
is created in e)
Application of the relation CREATED in analysis of the sentence in (3b), headed by design (compare (36) Performance verbs of creation such as recite (see (2)) differ from those denoting the creation of a template in that they entail an instantiation of the template in question. More precisely, such verbs take an internal argument denoting a template for events and they assert an instantiation of this template.
A new thematic relation PERFORMANCE may be defined in terms of INCREMENTAL and instantiation:
(56) PERFORMANCE(e, e) =def INCREMENTAL(e, e) ∧ e e (e is a performance of e)
No physical object is created, hence there is no need to appeal to the relation exist.
Analysis of the sentence in (2c), headed by recite: Primary analyses:
• Verbs denoting the creation of a physical object (see (1)) are analyzed as relations between events and physical objects with the help of the thematic relation created (e.g., (36)).
• Performance verbs of creation (see (2)) are treated as relations between events and templates for events (e.g., (57)) with the aid of the thematic relation PERFORMANCE.
• Verbs denoting the creation of a template (see (3)) are analyzed as relations between events and templates (e.g., (53) and (55)) with the assistance of the thematic relation CREATED.
Data indicate the need for sort shifters that are able to shift the internal argument of a verb from one sort to another.
Sentences in (4) and (5) suggest that verbs denoting the creation of a physical object sometimes appear to be able to take templates as their internal arguments.
Sort shifter (SSH-1):
Applying to a verb denoting a relation between events and physical objects and yields a verb denoting a relation between events and templates such that the templates are instantiated by a physical object:
Applying the shifter SSH-1 to build:
Assuming a Victorian style house that Sarah designed is analyzed as the existential quantifier over house templates in (61a) and that the sentence in (4a) has the schematic syntactic structure in (61b): A version of build that takes a physical object representing a template as its internal argument and asserts that this representation is derivatively instantiated (see (45)).
Sort shifter (SSH-2):
Performance verbs of creation sometimes take a physical object representing a template for events as their internal argument: (Taking a verb denoting the creation of an abstract individual and yields a verb taking a physical object as its internal argument which instantiates a template for physical objects) (66) Sarah designed the house on the corner. Verbs of creation are semantically decomposed with the help of the predicates CAUSE and BECOME, which are used for the analysis of accomplishments:
(68) John painted a picture.
[ The intuitive meaning assigned to this representation is that John's painting activity causes a picture to come into existence.
von Stechow (2001, sect. 4) : the major flaw in Dowty's analysis in (68) is that the corresponding truth conditions prohibit any picture at all from existing at the beginning of the interval of painting, and yet this is clearly too strong, because there may well be (other) pictures that exist in the world at the beginning of this interval.
Dowty's treatment does not handle performance verbs of creation (see (2)) or those denoting the creation of an abstract individual (see (3))-at best it serves for verbs denoting the creation of a physical object. 
Krifka (1989, 1992)
Krifka does not offer a treatment of verbs of creation.
His notion of graduality (Krifka 1992, p. 42) , which characterizes thematic relations that satisfy the properties uniqueness of objects, mapping to objects, and mapping to events in his framework, does not distinguish between 'effected patients' and 'consumed patients'.
His properties of mapping to objects and mapping to events are stronger than the properties of weak mapping to physical objects and weak mapping to events that I define in (32).
The property of weak mapping to events in (32b) allows for this, as I pointed out in section 2.2.
His mapping to objects is also too strong, because it would require every subevent of the building event to be an event in which a part of the house is built.
Krifka (1992, p. 46) notes in passing a possible extension of his approach for performance verbs of creation such as play in play a sonata (see also Krifka 1989, pp. 198-199) . He suggests introducing a domain of types and a relation of realization between tokens and types so that play could describe the realization of a type.
Von Stechow (2001)
The idea is that the analysis of verbs of creation makes use of a thematic relation I-Theme for the internal argument:
(70) I-Theme =def λwλeλ x [BECOMING(w, e)(λw'λt[exist(w',t) In light of von Stechow's definition of BECOMING (p. 290), this says that x is an I-Theme in w of e just in case x does not exist in w at the beginning of e, x exists in w at the end of e, and x is undefined for existence in w at any time properly between the beginning and end of e.
No understanding of the motivation for saying that x is undefined for existence between the beginning and the end of e.
Von Stechow's treatment covers only verbs denoting the creation of a physical object-he does not mention performance verbs of creation or verbs denoting the creation of an abstract individual.
McCready (2003a,b)
McCready focuses on the interaction between progressivized verbs of creation and anaphoric reference to partially created objects. He aims to account for contrasts such as the following:
(71) (a) John was painting a picture. #It was a masterpiece. McCready's idea is that it in (71a) cannot refer back to the partially completed picture that John was painting because the noun masterpiece may only apply to completed objects. In contrast, it in (71b) refers to an abstract object (namely, a house design) and not to the partially completed house that John was building. 
In order to treat build in (71b), he takes verbs of creation "to be ambiguous between a reading in which the verb acts as a 'verb of realization,' which selects for a property complement, and a reading taking an actual object, which describes an actual creation event."
The reading of build in (71b) is the one on which it takes a property complement. McCready represents the nonprogressivized version of the first sentence in (71b) as the following event predicate, which serves as the input to the progressive operator: 20 (73) John build-a house: λ e[build (john,λ x[house(x) 
])]
He takes the abstract objects of verbs of creation to be properties (extensionally, sets) and not bona fide first order individuals, albeit abstract.
Yet consider (e.g.) Sarah designed a house: it would be incorrect to say that Sarah designed the property of being a house-certainly she did not manage to do that. To get around this, McCready could say that she designed a subproperty of the property of being a house, which would extensionally amount to a subset of the set of houses. But if no one ever built the house that she designed, then she would have effectively designed the empty set, which is a very counterintuitive result.
He could then try to get around this by intensionalizing the property complement that design takes (e.g., by construing it as a function from possible worlds to sets of individuals), but this move would lack independent support in that design otherwise behaves like an extensional verb (unlike seek, for example).
But even putting this problem aside, McCready still has to clarify more explicitly the connection between (e.g.) build as a verb that takes a property complement (see (73)) and build as a verb that takes an individual argument, because from the formula in (73) it does not follow that a physical house is built (and the addition of a simple tense operator will not guarantee this either).
The present approach does not face these difficulties: Templates are first order individuals, albeit abstract, and behave as individuals for the purposes of quantification, anaphoric reference, and the like. Finally, the two senses of build that McCready is concerned with are analyzed in (36a) and (60), being explicitly related with the help of the sort shifter SSH-1 in (59).
Conclusion
Verbs of creation come in three sorts: verbs that denote the creation of a physical object (e.g., build), performance verbs of creation (e.g., sing), and those that denote the creation of an abstract individual (e.g., design).
The analysis presupposes a model structure that has an existence predicate and distinguishes between physical objects, events, times, and three kinds of templates (templates for physical objects, templates for events, and templates for times).
Templates are abstract (first order) individuals that are existentially anchored to physical objects with the help of a relation of representation and which may also be connected to concrete individuals by means of a relation of instantiation.
The analysis provides a set of sort shifters that serve to capture systematic ambiguity among verbs of creation (e.g., the distinction between build as a verb denoting the creation of a physical object and build as a verb denoting the instantiation of a template).
The approach fares better than the competition as a general account of verbs of creation.
